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VALUATION OF SPOUSAL INTEREST IN A PROFESSIONAL
PRACTICE FOR EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION: HIRSCHFELD v.
HIRSCHFELD
I. INTRODUCTION
The New York court in Hirschfeld v. Hirschfeld' held that under the
state's equitable distribution statute2 a husband's interest in his law prac-
tice constitutes marital property subject to equitable division upon di-
vorce. The court noted the lack of a valuation standard in both the stat-
ute and the state case law and applied an Internal Revenue Service
formula to calculate the amount of goodwill in the law practice.3 The
court divided that amount equally and awarded the wife $6,900, over
three years, as her share of the husband's net income from his law
practice.4
The New York statute concerning distribution of marital property
upon divorce is representative of one of the three approaches utilized by
the courts in dividing property. Under an equitable distribution ap-
proach, the court is vested with equitable power to distribute the marital
property among the parties, regardless of legal title, in order to achieve an
equitable apportionment.5 The second method is the common law or title
approach wherein the court can only distribute property according to le-
gal title.6 Under the final method, the community property approach, all
property acquired during marriage is held jointly with each spouse pos-
sessing a one-half interest. 7 In both the community property and equit-
1. 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2403 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 4, 1982).
2. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 236 Part B (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
3. Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 C.B. 327.
4. Hirschfeld, 8 FAM. L. REP. at 2404.
5. See Grossman, Identification and Valuation of Assets Subject to Distribution, 56
N.D.L. REv. 201 (1980). The equitable distribution approach is recognized in forty-one juris-
dictions: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Colum-
bia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Wiscon-
sin, and Wyoming. Freed & Foster, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview as of
September 1982, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4065, 4079-83 (Sept. 28, 1982).
6. The common law or title approach is recognized in only two jurisdictions: Mississippi
and West Virginia. Virginia was the third "title" state until July 1, 1982. Freed & Foster,
supra note 5, at 4079.
7. See generally W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHAN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 1
(2d ed. 1971). The community property approach is recognized in nine jurisdictions: Ari-
zona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Puerto Rico, Texas and Washing-
ton. Freed & Foster, supra note 5, at 4079.
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able distribution jurisdictions where the court is authorized to distribute
marital property, questions have arisen concerning whether an interest in
a professional practice constitutes marital property divisible upon di-
vorce, and if so, the value which should be placed on this interest.
The determination of whether a wife" has a spousal interest in the hus-
band's professional practice usually follows one of two approaches.' If the
husband has an established professional practice, the wife will seek her
share through a determination that the husband's interest in the practice
constitutes marital property.10 If, on the other hand, the husband has
only recently obtained his professional degree or license and has not yet
established a practice, a wife will seek her share through a determination
that the degree or license constitutes marital property subject to divi-
sion."1 The Hirschfeld case fell into the first category. Analysis of the sec-
ond category is beyond the scope of the present article. The determina-
tion of whether an interest in a professional practice constitutes marital
property and the value which should attach is of current significance in
8. For convenience and clarity, the term "husband" in this article will refer to the spouse
engaged in the professional practice; and "wife" will refer to the spouse seeking to partici-
pate in equitable distribution. Reversal of the roles would not affect the outcome of the
case.
9. See Raggio, Professional Goodwill and Professional Licenses as Property Subject to
Distribution Upon Dissolution of Marriage, 16 FAM. L.Q. 147 (1982).
10. See, e.g., Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1969); Mueller v.
Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 (1956); In re Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo. App.
383, 606 P.2d 1314 (1979); In re Marriage of White, 98 Ill. App. 3d 380, 424 N.E.2d 421
(1981); Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975); Levy v. Levy, 164 N.J. Super. 542,
397 A.2d 374 (1978); In re Marriage of Goger, 27 Or. App. 729, 557 P.2d 46 (1976); In re
Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481, 558 P.2d 279 (1976). But see Nail v. Nail, 486
S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972) (accrued goodwill of husband's medical practice does not constitute
community property).
11. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978) (potential for
increased earnings from law degree is a marital asset); Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1979), modified, 8 FAM. L. RaP. (BNA) 2329 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1982) (license
to practice denistry is marital property); Reen v. Reen, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2193 (Mass. P.
& Farn. Ct. Dec. 23, 1981) (license to practice orthodontic medicine is a marital asset); Lynn
v. Lynn, No. 78-297 (N.J. Super. Ct. Dec. 5, 1980) (medical degree and license to practice
medicine are assets subject to equitable distribution); Daniels v. Daniels, 20 Ohio Op. 2d
458, 185 N.E.2d 773 (1961) (right to practice a profession is property). But see In re Mar-
riage of Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (1981) (medical license and education are not
community properties subject to division); Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 131 (1969) (legal education is not community property); In re Marriage of Graham,
194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978) (master's degree in business administration is not prop-
erty); Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97 (1978) (medical degree is not a
marital asset); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062 (1982) (master's
degree in business administration is not subject to equitable distribution). See generally
Kenderdine, Contributions to Spouse's Education: The Search for Compensation When
the Marriage Ends, 5 OKLA. CiTY U.L. REv. 409 (1980); Comment, Family Law: Ought a
Professional Degree be Divisible as Property Upon Divorce? 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 517
(1981); Annot., 4 A.L.R.4th 1294 (1981).
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Virginia. In 1982, Virginia abandoned its strict common law view of mari-
tal property in favor of an equitable distribution format.12
This comment will focus on two areas: (i) examination and analysis of
Hirschfeld and other pertinent case law, and (2) discussion of various val-
uation methods for determining the monetary value of the spousal
interest.
II. DETERMINATION OF SPOUSAL INTEREST IN A PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE
AS MARITAL PROPERTY
A. Statement of the Case
Lee and Howard Hirschfeld were married in 1959. At the time of their
marriage the parties possessed little marital property, and their combined
income was correspondingly low. Shortly thereafter, Howard established a
professional practice as a sole legal practitioner. The parties moved to
New York where they settled and raised a family. Howard continued his
professional practice in New York; and Lee, in addition to raising the
children and being a full-time homemaker, was employed part-time as a
travel agent. After being married for over twenty years, Howard aban-
doned the marital home in 1980. Lee brought suit for a divorce one year
later.1
3
Lee's petition for divorce was brought pursuant to New York's equita-
ble distribution statute. 4 Formerly a strict common law or title state,15
the New York legislature enacted the equitable distribution statute8 in
recognition of the modern view of the marriage relationship as an eco-
nomic partnership.17 Under this statute, "property accumulated during
the marriage should be distributed in a manner which reflects the indi-
vidual needs and circumstances of the parties regardless of the name in
which such property is held."18 A threshold issue in Hirschfeld was
whether Howard's interest in his law practice constituted separate or
marital property, as only marital property is subject to equitable
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
13. Hirschfeld v. Hirschfeld, 8 F~m. L. REP. (BNA) 2403, 2403 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 4,
1982).
14. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236 Part B (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
15. Id., Practice Commentary at 33; Foster, An Explanation of the New York 1980 Equi-
table Distribution Law, 6 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2651 (July 15, 1980).
16. See generally DiLeo & Model, A Survey of the Law of Property Disposition Upon
Divorce in the Tristate Area, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 219 (1982); Note, New York's Equitable
Distribution Law: A Sweeping Reform, 47 BROOKLYN L. Rv. 67 (1980).
17. "The distribution of property upon the termination of a marriage should be treated,
as nearly as possible, like the distribution of assets incident to the dissolution of a partner-
ship." UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT, 9A U.L.A. 91, prefatory note at 93.
18. N.Y. Dohf. REL. LAW § 236 Part B, Practice Commentary at 33 (McKinney Supp.
1981-1982) (quoting N.Y. Laws, at 1863 (Governor's Memorandum of Approval)).
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distribution.19
The court impliedly held that Howard's interest was marital property °
and proceeded to an evaluation of the statutory considerations for an eq-
uitable disposition.2 Howard earned an average of $67,600 a year; and
Lee averaged $5,500. They had been married almost twenty-one years,
and while Lee was in good health, Howard suffered from a medical ail-
ment which impaired his ability to work. The marital home was occupied
19. Separate and marital property are defined by statute:
c. The term "marital property" shall mean all property acquired by either or both
spouses during the marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or
the commencement of a matrimonial action, regardless of the form in which title is
held, except as otherwise provided in agreement pursuant to subdivision three of this
part. Marital property shall not include separate property as hereinafter defined.
d. The term separate property shall mean:
(1) property acquired before marriage or property acquired by bequest, devise, or
descent, or gift from a party other than the spouse;
(2) compensation for personal injuries;
(3) property acquired in exchange for or the increase in value of separate property,
except to the extent that such appreciation is due in part to the contributions or
efforts of the other spouse;
(4) property described as separate property by written agreement of the parties
pursuant to subdivision three of this part.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 Part B(1)(c), (d) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
20. The court's opinion never specifically stated that the husband's interest was marital
property. Hirschfeld, 8 FAM. L. REP. at 2404. However, this finding was implicit in the valu-
ation of that interest for equitable distribution purposes. In addition, the New York court
previously held in the first case under the equitable distribution statute that the husband's
interest in a closely-held professional corporation was marital property subject to equitable
distribution. Nehorayoff v. Nehorayoff, 108 Misc. 2d 311, 437 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1981).
21. In determining an equitable disposition of property under paragraph c, the court shall
consider:
(1) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage, and at the time
of the commencement of the action;
(2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties;
(3) the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital residence and to use
or own its household effects;
(4) the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the marriage as of
the date of dissolution;
(5) any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this part;
(6) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the
acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, including joint
efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a spouse, parent, wage
earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the other party;
(7) the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property;
(8) the probable future financial circumstances of each party;
(9) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest
in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of retaining
such asset or interest intact and free from any claim or interference by the other
party;
(10) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 Part B(5)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1981-82).
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by Lee and the children. Neither party had any interest in a pension or
an inheritance. Lee had served as both a part-time wage earner for the
family and a full-time homemaker. She was awarded $245 per week as
maintenance. Both parties agreed to divide their personal property by
stipulation at trial. Their respective incomes will continue to rise in the
forthcoming years, although the exact amount is only conjectural. The
extent of Lee's interest in Howard's practice was not subject to easy eval-
uation, and the retention of the practice intact and free from any claim
was economically desirable. Finally, the court noted that goodwill could
not ethically be sold for valuable consideration.22
Based on these considerations, the court held, among other things, 23
that Lee was entitled to a share of Howard's interest in the law practice.
However, the court noted the absence of any standard in either the stat-
ute or New York case law for determination of the amount of her share.2 4
Citing persuasive authority,25 the court adopted the formula approach
promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service. 26 This method determines
the value of a business's intangible assets, such as goodwill, by the capi-
talization of excess earnings over a reasonable return on tangible assets.27
Using this method, the court determined the goodwill in Howard's prac-
tice to be $13,800 and awarded Lee one-half as her equitable share.2 8
22. Hirschfeld, 8 FAm. L. REP. at 2403.
23. The court's decree contained further provisions for the final dissolution of the mar-
riage. Howard was ordered to provide maintenance to Lee in the amount of $245 per week
until the marital home was sold, at which time the amount would be reduced to $175. He
was ordered to pay $20 per week child support for each child until majority, in addition to
educational expenses. Further, he was required to maintain medical insurance on the family
and a life insurance policy on his own life to cover the total amount of the divorce decree.
Lee was granted exclusive use of the marital home, joint custody of the children, and attor-
ney's fees in the amount of $7,000. Finally, the court advised the parties to voluntarily ob-
tain a Jewish divorce. Id. at 2404.
24. Id. at 2403.
25. Id. at 2403 (citing Levy v. Levy, 164 N.J. Super. 542, 397 A.2d 374 (1978) (court em-
ployed the formula approach to determine the value of the husband's interest in his law
practice for equitable distribution purposes)).
26. Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 C.B. 327.
27. Id.
28. Interestingly, the same court, although a different judge, reached an opposite conclu-
sion in a case decided several weeks later. In Barton v. Barton the court rejected the capital-
ization formula as an appropriate means of distributing the husband's interest in his law
practice under the equitable distribution statute. 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2453 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 20, 1982). The court cited such factors as the inherent unpredictability of a negligence
law practice, the extreme fluctuations in yearly income, the lack of goodwill, and the lack of
any direct contributions by the wife to the husband's professional achievement. Neverthe-
less, the wife was awarded $40,000 or 24% of the husband's net income for one year as her
distributive share. Id. This decision seems to limit the application of the capitalization
formula to professional practices with stable income patterns and an empirically verifiable
asset of goodwill.
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B. Case Law
In addition to Hirschfeld, other courts have confronted the question of
whether the husband's interest in a professional practice is marital prop-
erty. By an overwhelming majority, courts have held such interest to be
marital property subject to equitable distribution.29 The courts have typi-
cally used one of two methods in arriving at their decision. The first
method is the determination that the goodwill of a professional practice is
marital property subject to division.30 The other method is a determina-
tion that the practice itself is the marital asset.3' Although the result is
the same under either method, the particular method selected does affect
the ultimate valuation method employed.
1. Professional Goodwill as Marital Property
The most well-known definition of goodwill is by Justice Story:
[Goodwill is] the advantage or benefit which is acquired by an establish-
ment beyond the mere value of the capital, stocks, funds, or property em-
ployed therein, in consequence of the general public patronage and encour-
agement which it receives from constant or habitual customers, on account
of its local position or common celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence,
or punctuality, or from other accidental circumstances or necessities, or
even from ancient partialities or prejudices.32
Goodwill as a marital asset has been the subject of many commentaries
which uniformly recognize various problems in placing goodwill in such a
capacity. 3 First, it is unethical and against public policy to sell the good-
29. The only jurisdiction which has addressed the question of the spouse's interest and
refused to recognize the goodwill of a professional practice as property is Texas. Nail v. Nail,
486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972). See infra text accompanying notes 50-52.
30. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Webb, 94 Cal. App. 3d 335, 156 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1979); In re
Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1974); In re Marriage of Fortier,
34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1973); Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 75
Cal. Rptr. 735 (1969); Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 (1956); In re
Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo. App. 383, 606 P.2d 1314 (1979); In re Marriage of Fleege, 91
Wash. 2d 324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979); In re Marriage of Freedman, 23 Wash. App. 27, 592
P.2d 1124 (1979); In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481, 558 P.2d 279 (1976).
31. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974); Todd
v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969); In re Marriage of White, 98 Ill. App.
3d 380, 424 N.E.2d 421 (1981); Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975); Levy v.
Levy, 164 N.J. Super. 542, 397 A.2d 374 (1978); Grayer v. Grayer, 147 N.J. Super. 513, 371
A.2d 753 (1977); Hurley v. Hurley, 94 N.M. 641, 615 P.2d 256 (1980). But see Ellsworth v.
Ellsworth, 97 N.M. 133, -, 637 P.2d 564, 566 (1981) (overruling Hurley to the extent that
it "would preclude any consideration of the community property awarded to a spouse in
reaching an equitable award of alimony"). See also Nehorayoff v. Nehorayoff, 108 Misc. 2d
311, 437 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1981); In re Marriage of Goger, 27 Or. App. 729, 557 P.2d 46 (1976).
32. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIPS § 99, at 170 (6th ed. 1868),
quoted in Whittle v. Davie, 116 Va. 575, 82 S.E. 724 (1914).
33. See generally Raggio, supra note 9; Comment, Valuation of Professional Goodwill
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will of a law firm for valuable consideration."4 Second, goodwill is an in-
herently intangible asset. 5 Third, there is no set standard or rule for de-
termining the existence of goodwill.3" Instead, the question of goodwill is
a matter of fact and not of law.
3 7
The courts have promulgated a few guidelines in dealing with goodwill.
First, any consideration of goodwill generally cannot be based on future
earnings or post-marital efforts. Second, the timing of the valuation is
the period between the time of marriage and the filing of divorce. 9 Fi-
nally, it should be "determined with considerable care and caution, since
it is a unique situation in which the continuing practitioner is judicially
forced to buy an intangible asset at a judicially determined value and
compelled to pay a former spouse her share in tangible assets."40
The proposition that the goodwill of a professional practice is marital
Upon Marital Dissolution, 7 Sw. L.J. 186 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Valuation of Good-
will]; Comment, Identifying, Valuing, and Dividing Professional Goodwill as Community
Property at Dissolution of the Marital Community, 56 TuL. L. REV. 313 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Identifying Professional Goodwill]; Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 1344 (1973).
34. "An attorney may not purchase the practice and goodwill of a deceased attor-
ney. . . ." ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 266 (1945). "A lawyer in private
practice shall not practice under a trade name, a name that is misleading as to the identity
of the lawyer or lawyers practicing under such name, or a firm name containing names other
than those of one or more of the lawyers in the firm .... ." VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONsmiLITY DR 2-102(B) (1976), reprinted in VA. Sup. CT. R. 6:11, 216 Va. 1064, 1078
(1976). See also Annot., 79 A.L.R. 3d 124 (1977).
However, subsequent case law has made it clear that although the goodwill may not be
sold ethically, it is still possible to recognize it as "a real element of economic worth" in
determining the value of a professional practice. Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, _, 331 A.2d
257, 261 n.5 (1975). See also Levy v. Levy, 164 N.J. Super. 542, 397 A.2d 374 (1978).
35. The Virginia Supreme Court has said: "Goodwill is one of those intangible assets of
an established business difficult to describe and impossible of valuing with mathematical
precision, but, with all, of very real existence and of substantial value." Wood v. Pender-
Doxey Grocery Co., 151 Va. 706, 712, 144 S.E. 635, 637 (1928). Nevertheless, this difficulty is
no reason to refuse to recognize its existence. In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93,
108, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 67 (1974).
36. 38 Cal. App. 3d at 109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 68; In re Marriage of Goger, 27 Or. App. 729,
-, 557 P.2d 46, 47 (1976).
37. In re marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1974); Levy v. Levy,
164 N.J. Super. 542, 397 A.2d 374 (1978); In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481, 558
P.2d 279 (1976).
38. This prohibition is absolute in community property jurisdictions. Since only property
acquired during the marriage is community property, it would be inconsistent with the com-
munity property philosophy to include the post-marital efforts of either party in the valua-
tion. In re Marriage of Fortier, 34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1973). Equitable
distribution jurisdictions allow its limited use as one factor in arriving at an equitable distri-
bution. Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975).
39. See Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974); Identifying Professional
Goodwill, supra note 33, at 331-32.
40. In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 110, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 68 (1974) (empha-
sis in original).
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property was first enunciated in dicta in the California case of Mueller v.
Mueller.4 1 The husband argued that goodwill could not attach to his den-
tal laboratory business because such a business depends solely upon the
personal skill and ability of the individual owner. The court stated that
the question of whether his practice possessed goodwill was a question of
fact. Since the lower court found substantial evidence that his business
was not based exclusively upon his own efforts, the court rejected his ar-
gument.," Therefore, the trial court's finding of goodwill in the amount of
$25,000 was affirmed. Continuing in dictum, the court stated that even if
the practice were based solely on his personal skills and abilities, goodwill
could nevertheless be attached to his business:
The better doctrine, however, appears to be that goodwill also exists in a
professional practice or in a business which is founded upon personal skill
or reputation. Where a person acquires a reputation for skill and learning in
a particular profession, as, for instance, in that of a lawyer, a physician, or
an editor, he often creates an intangible but valuable property by winning
the confidence of his patrons and securing immunity from successful compe-
tition for their business, and it would seem to be well settled that this is a
species of goodwill which may be the subject of transfer. 3
The dicta in Mueller was relied upon in Golden v. Golden4 4 to hold
that the goodwill of a husband's medical practice constitutes a marital
asset subject to division upon divorce. The trial court placed a monetary
value on the practice, including $32,500 for goodwill. Even though the
husband was awarded the goodwill, he was ordered to pay the wife one-
half of the total value of the practice. On appeal, the husband attacked
the decree on the basis of previous case law holding that no allowance
could be made for goodwill upon the dissolution of a professional prac-
tice.45 The court rejected his argument on the grounds that his practice
was not being dissolved in the present proceedings. Instead, the court was
merely placing a monetary value on the firm's goodwill for purposes of
determining the total value of marital property available for division; and
afterwards his business would continue with the same value it had pos-
sessed previously. The court held that "the better rule is that, in a di-
vorce case, the goodwill of the husband's professional practice as a sole
41. 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 (1956).
42. Id. at 250, 301 P.2d at 95.
43. Id. at 250-51, 301 P.2d at 94-95 (quoting 24 AM. JUR. Goodwill § 11, at 808 (1939)).
The court's reliance on the legal encyclopedia American Jurisprudence has been criticized
because the section from which the quotation was extracted dealt with the sale of a profes-
sional practice and not an evaluation for marital dissolution purposes. Lurvey, Professional
Goodwill on Marital Dissolution: Is it Property or Another Name for Alimony? 52 CAL. ST.
B.J. 27, 30 (1977).
44. 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1969).
45. Lyon v. Lyon, 246 Cal. App. 2d 519, 54 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1966) (court held that no
allowance for goodwill could be made upon the dissolution of a law practice because its
value was dependent upon the skill of each partner).
[Vol. 17:383
VALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE
practitioner should be taken into consideration in determining the award
to the wife." '46 The court recognized that the wife is entitled to compensa-
tion for her contributions to the husband's earnings and accumulations
during the marriage by virtue of her position in the family.47
The decision in Golden firmly established the rule that professional
goodwill is a marital asset subject to division upon divorce. Subsequent
cases have reinforced that finding and differ only on the correct method
by which to place a monetary value on the asset.48 Although the majority
of these cases were decided in community property jurisdictions, similar
results have been reached in equitable distribution jurisdictions. 49
One jurisdiction, however, has refused to recognize professonal goodwill
as an asset. In Nail v. Nail" the Texas Supreme Court held that the
goodwill of a medical practice does not constitute marital property sub-
ject to division upon dissolution of marriage. The lower court valued the
husband's medical practice at $131,000, inclusive of goodwill. Based upon
this finding, the wife was awarded $40,000 as her community interest in
the husband's practice.51 On appeal, the court reversed the lower court's
valuation insofar as it relied on the item of goodwill. The court stated
that the goodwill of the husband's practice
did not possess value or constitute an asset separate and apart from his
person, or from his individual ability to practice his profession. It would be
extinguished in event of his death, or retirement, or disablement, as well as
in event of the sale of his practice or the loss of his patients, whatever the
46. Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d at 405, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 737.
47. Id. at 405, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
48. E.g., In re Marriage of Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (1981) (The goodwill of a
plastic surgeon's medical practice must be included in a division of property upon divorce.);
In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1974) (The goodwill of a
medical practice, valued at $27,000, is property subject to division upon dissolution of mar-
riage.); In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974) (The goodwill
of a law partnership is an asset subject to division.); In re Marriage of Fortier, 34 Cal. App.
3d 384, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1973) (The $10,963 value of a medical practice's goodwill is
community property.); In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481, 558 P.2d 279 (1976)
(The value of $60,000 for goodwill of an osteopathic practice is an asset subject to division.).
49. E.g., Rostel v. Rostel, 622 P.2d 429 (Alaska 1981) (The court upheld division of the
income-earning capacity, or goodwill, of a close corporation under an equitable distribution
statute.); In re Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo. App. 383, 606 P.2d 1314 (1979) (The value of
goodwill incident to the husband's dental practice is marital property subject to division.);
Levy v. Levy, 164 N.J. Super. 542, 397 A.2d 374 (1978) (The goodwill of a law practice,
despite its ethical nonsalability, is an asset subject to distribution under an equitable distri-
bution statute.).
The case law from the community property jurisdictions, however, should not be disre-
garded in a proceeding under an equitable distribution statute. The cases should be offered
as persuasive authority for holding professional goodwill subject to distribution. Grossman,
supra note 5, at 218.
50. 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972).
51. Id. at 761-62.
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cause .... The goodwill of the husband's medical practice... may not be
characterized as an earned or vested right or one which fixes any benefit in
any sum at any future time. That it would have value in the future is no
more than an expectancy wholly dependent upon the continuation of ex-
isting circumstances. Accordingly, we hold that the good will of petitioner's
medical practice that may have accrued at the time of the divorce was not
property in the estate of the parties .... 51
The holding in Nail has been severely criticized, mainly on the basis of
its reasoning. 53 However, the application of its holding must also be criti-
cized for producing inequitable results; a wife who has made substantial
contributions to the husband's career may be denied her rightful share of
the fruits of her labor.54 The precedential value of Nail has been dimin-
ished by subsequent decisions. The Texas court later recognized the exis-
tence of goodwill in a professional corporation as opposed to a sole practi-
tioner.55 In addition, a decision from another jurisdiction has stated that
the concept of vesting is inapplicable to equitable distribution of marital
property upon divorce. 56
2. Professional Practice as Marital Property
The second method utilized by the courts to distribute the husband's
interest in his professional practice is to find that the practice itself con-
stitutes marital property. However, this does not mean that the husband
must sell the practice or admit the wife as a silent partner in order to
achieve an equitable distribution. New York is representative of many
states which have provided for a monetary or distributive award that pro-
vides the wife with her share of the practice, while having no impact on
the professional practice itself.57 The husband's practice continues unin-
52. Id. at 764.
53. E.g., Identifying Professional Goodwill, supra note 33, at 319-22 (criticizing the
court's reliance on the question of whether the practice's goodwill was a vested property
interest).
54. E.g., Stephens v. Stephens, 625 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (The professional
goodwill of the husband's medical practice was disregarded as an asset subject to division
even though the wife put him through medical school, worked in his business, and continued
working outside the home once his practice was established.).
55. Geesbreght v. Geesbreght, 570 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). Nail was distin-
guished on the grounds that the professional corporation was not based on the individual
services of the husband. Id. at 434.
56. Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975) (dicta).
57. The New York statute provides:
In any action in which the court shall determine that an equitable distribution is
appropriate but would be impractical or burdensome or where the distribution of an
interest in a business, corporation or profession would be contrary to law, the court in
lieu of such equitable distribution shall make a distributive award in order to achieve
equity between the parties. The court in its discretion, also may make a distributive
award to supplement, facilitate or effectuate a distribution of marital property.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 Part B(5)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1981-82).
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terrupted and unencumbered. 8
Although the court in Hirschfeld held that the professional practice of
a sole practitioner was a marital asset subject to distribution, 9 other
forms of professional practices are also capable of classification as marital
property. The Illinois court in In re Marriage of White"0 held that the
husband's interest in a professional corporation was marital property.61
The wife had appealed the lower court's division of marital property on
the grounds that the husband's professional dental corporation was not
included. The court reversed the decree and held a professional corpora-
tion was included within the definition of property under that state's eq-
uitable distribution statute. The court stated: "[W]e [do not] perceive
any economic or public policy reason why a professional corporation
should not be treated as marital property subject to disposition by the
court. ' 62 Similar decisions have held that interests in professional part-
nerships63 and closely-held professional corporations64 are also marital
property.
III. VALUATION METHODS
Once the husband's interest is determined to be marital property sub-
ject to equitable distribution, the court must place a monetary value on
the spousal interest. This monetary value is then subject to equitable dis-
tribution. Since there is no standard formula, each court has employed its
own methodology in valuating spousal interest in a professional practice,
resulting in the use of various valuation methods.
A. Accounting Formulas
According to accounting principles, goodwill is the earnings in excess of
a fair rate of return on the tangible assets of a business.6 5 The Internal
Revenue Service has recognized several methods of placing a monetary
58. Foster, supra note 15, at 2653.
59. Hirschfeld v. Hirschfeld, 8 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2403, 2403 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 4,
1982).
60. 98 IlM. App. 3d 380, 424 N.E.2d 421 (1981).
61. Courts in other jurisdictions have also held that a professional corporation constitutes
marital property. Moss v. Moss, 190 Colo. 491, 549 P.2d 404 (1976) (professional medical
corporation); Grayer v. Grayer, 147 N.J. Super. 513, 371 A.2d 753 (1977) (professional law
corporation); In re Marriage of Goger, 27 Or. App. 729, 557 P.2d 46 (1976) (professional
dental corporation).
62. White, 98 IMI. App. 3d at -, 424 N.E.2d at 423.
63. Stem v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975) (law partnership).
64. Nehorayoff v. Nehorayoff, 108 Misc. 2d 311, 437 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1981) (closely-held
professional medical corporation).
65. Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 C.B. 327; Rev. Ru. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 241, modified,
Rev. Rul. 65-193, 1965-2 C.B. 370; Valuation of Corporate Stock: Goodwill, 1981 STAND.
FED. TAX. REP. (CCH) 1 4460.2995.
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value on goodwill, the most common of which is the formula approach.66
The monetary value under this method is determined by taking the aver-
age annual income of the business 7 and subtracting an appropriate rate
of return for the tangible assets. The remaining amount is the average
annual income produced by the intangible asset of goodwill. The mone-
tary value of the business' goodwill is then determined by capitalizing
this amount at an appropriate rate."' The theory behind the formula ap-
proach is that the asset of goodwill represents a future flow of income
which can be reduced to its present value in the form of a lump sum
payment.6 " The formula approach is an appropriate valuation method
only if no better basis is available for determining the value of goodwill.70
The court in Hirschfeld adopted the formula approach to determine
the monetary value of Howard's interest in the law practice. However, the
66. 1981 STAND. FED. TAX. REP. (CCH) T 4460.2995. The first accounting formula for valu-
ating goodwill is the straight capitalization method. This method capitalizes the average net
profits of a business at a particular rate. The resulting value is the total value of the busi-
ness, including the values of both tangible and intangible assets. The second accounting
formula is the three-or five-year purchase method. A specified rate of return is allowed on
the tangible assets of a business. This return is subtracted from the average profits, and the
remainder is multiplied by either three or five, depending on which plan is used, to deter-
mine the amount of goodwill. However, the first two methods are rarely used by the courts
because of the arbitrary manner in which value is assigned to goodwill. Valuation of Good-
will, supra note 33, at 194. The final accounting formula is the income tax method, also
known as the formula approach or the capitalization of excess earnings. The monetary value
of goodwill is determined by the following method:
A percentage return on the average annual value of the tangible assets used in a
business is determined, using a period of years (preferably not less than five) immedi-
ately prior to the valuation date. The amount of the percentage return on tangible
assets, thus determined, is deducted from the average earnings of the business for
such period; and the remainder, if any, is considered to be the amount of the average
annual earnings from the intangible assets of the business for the period. This
amount (considered as the average annual earnings from intangibles), capitalized at a
percentage of, for example, 15 to 20 percent, is the value of the intangible assets of
the business determined under the "formula" approach.
Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 C.B. 327.
67. To determine the average annual income, the earnings from the last five years should
be averaged with any abnormally high or low amounts being ignored. If the subject business
is a sole practitioner or a partnership, a reasonable amount for salary must be deducted.
Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 C.B. 327, 328.
68. The appropriate capitalization rate is dependent upon the facts in each situation.
Three factors which influence the determination of the rate are: (1) the nature of the busi-
ness; (2) the risk involved; and (3) the stability or irregularity of the earnings. The suggested
rate for a business with relatively high hazards is a five year multiplier or twenty percent.
This rate would be less for a business with a small risk factor and stable, regular earnings.
Id. at 328.
69. Virginia Law Foundation, First Annual Family Law Seminar: An Analysis of Equita-
ble Distribution III - 18 (1982) (pamphlet in Continuing Legal Education Series). See also
Comment, Community Property Valuation of Professional Goodwill: Hurley v. Hurley, 11
N.M.L. REV. 435, 442 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Community Property Valuation].
70. Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 C.B. 327 at 328.
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court actually applied a "modified" formula approach. If the lawyer earns
more from his practice than the average salary paid for similar legal ser-
vices in the industry, then the excess earnings are deemed capital assets.7 1
The wife would then be entitled to an equitable share of that amount.
Both Howard and Lee hired expert witnesses to testify as to the amount
available for equitable distribution under the formula approach. Predict-
ably, both reached dramatically different results. The wife's expert testi-
fied that the husband's average annual net income was $26,323; and the
amount available for distribution was $23,707.50. The husband's expert,
on the other hand, testified that the husband's average annual net income
was only $18,872; and since the average salary for the same services was
$20,000 in the corporate industry, there was no goodwill attributable to
the practice.7 2 However, the court rejected both valuations and instead
substituted its own determination.7 3 The court found that in applying
Revenue Ruling 68-609, the average gross earnings of the husband's law
practice was $67,600. This amount was reduced by 50% to account for
the cost of overhead,7 4 resulting in an average net income of $33,800. The
court subtracted the sum of $20,000 from the net income as the average
salary available in a corporate position and determined that the amount
available for equitable distribution was $13,800. Accordingly, Lee was
awarded $6,900 over three years as her equitable share of Howard's inter-
est in his law practice.7 5
The formula approach has been applied by other courts to determine
the value of spousal interest in a professional practice.7 6 However, the
71. Hirschfeld v. Hirschfeld, 8 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2403, 2403 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 4,
1982).
72. Id. The text of the opinion lacks information regarding the methods used by the ex-
perts to determine these figures.
73. Id. at 2403-04. This action was properly within the discretion of the court under the
New York equitable distribution statute. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236 Part B. (McKinney
Supp. 1981-1982).
74. The court noted that the average overhead for a single practitioner is between 45 and
55% of gross earnings. One of the reasons for rejecting the husband's valuation was its utili-
zation of a 70% figure as overhead. Hirschfeld, 8 FAm. L. REP. at 2404.
75. Even though the court divided the net income equally between the husband and wife,
a 50-50 division was not mandated by the statute. Id.; Foster, supra note 15, at 2653. The
New York statute only requires an equitable division between the spouses. N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 236 Part B(5)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
76. In re Marriage of Webb, 94 Cal. App. 3d 335, 156 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1979) ($16,000 value
for goodwill was determined by a combination of capitalization of excess earnings and mar-
ket value); Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 (1956) (court upheld valua-
tion of goodwill at $25,000 under two methods, one of which was a capitalization of excess
earnings); Levy v. Levy, 164 N.J. Super. 542, 397 A.2d 374 (1978) (court applied Revenue
Ruling 68-609 but found no goodwill because the average earnings were less than average
salary in the industry); Hurley v. Hurley, 94 N.M. 641, 615 P.2d 256 (1980) (court held that
the capitalization of excess earnings was a proper method to determine value of a profes-
sional practice). But see Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 97 N.M. 133, _, 637 P.2d 564, 566 (1981)
(court overruled Hurley to extent it "would preclude any consideration of the community
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application in Hirschfeld differs substantially due to its failure to apply a
multiplier.77 When the court subtracted the average salary from the net
income, the remaining amount was not the amount of goodwill available
for distribution, but the average annual income produced by the goodwill.
In order for the court to arrive at the value of goodwill, that amount
should have been capitalized by an appropriate rate or number of years.
The court in Levy v. Levy 78 stated that the appropriate multiple would
"vary inversely with the amount and intensity of competitiveness in the
line of business being appraised. '79 The court in Nehorayoff v.
NehorayofPO held that the multiplier for a closely-held medical corpora-
tion was between three and four. In addition, the court in Mueller v.
Mueller"' applied a capitalization rate of three to a dental laboratory bus-
iness. By applying the foregoing, the appropriate value of the practice's
goodwill available for distribution should have been at least $41,400
($13,800 multiplied by three). Therefore, Lee's share should have been
$20,700 instead of $6,900.82
property awarded to a spouse in reaching an equitable award of alimony").
77. A multiplier is the number of years after the sale of a business that a purchaser will
pay the seller for the net profits of the business. Community Property Valuation, supra
note 69, at 446 n.74. Under the formula approach, the amount of income produced by good-
will is capitalized or multiplied by the number of years of the multiplier. This results in the
monetary value of the goodwill. The court in Hirschfeld either applied a multiplier of one,
in which case the monetary value of the goodwill would not have changed, or no rate at all.
The facts as reported in the opinion are insufficient to determine which is the correct inter-
pretation. Hirschfeld, 8 FAM. L. REP. at 2404.
The court also failed to deduct a reasonable return on the tangible assets of the business
from the average annual income. Again there are insufficient facts as to the court's reason-
ing. Id. One possible reason is that a law practice is based on the personal services of the
lawyer, and as such, the amount of tangible assets is negligible.
78. 164 N.J. Super. 542, 397 A.2d 374 (1978).
79. Id. at -, 397 A.2d at 380.
80. 108 Misc. 2d 311, -, 437 N.Y.S.2d 584, 591 (1981).
81. 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 (1956). This capitalization rate was not explicitly
stated in the opinion. However, it is determined by implication through an analysis of the
court's holding. See Valuation of Goodwill, supra note 33, at 195 n.51.
82. The following hypothetical illustrates the application of the formula approach: Sup-
pose the professional spouse has had an average annual income over the last five years of
$50,000. In addition, suppose that he or she has tangible assets in the professional practice
worth approximately $20,000. On these facts and the values suggested in Rev. Rul. 68-609,
the value of the goodwill is determined as follows:
average annual income $50,000
- return on tangible assets (10%) (2,000)
average annual income produced by goodwill 48,000
- average salary in same profession (45,000)
excess earnings 3,000
x capitalization x 5
value of intangible asset of goodwill 15,000
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The formula approach is generally considered to be the best method,
where appropriate, for valuing the spousal interest in professional prac-
tices.8 3 It is an accurate measurement of true value and is commonly used
and understood by the court and expert witnesses."4 However, the
formula approach does suffer from several disadvantages: (1) it is only
appropriate where no better method of valuation is available; 5 (2) expert
witnesses are frequently unable to adequately explain its theoretical ba-
sis;88 (3) it is difficult to determine an average salary for similar services;
(4) it is difficult to choose an appropriate multiplier;8 7 and (5) it can
sometimes lead to unpredictable results.8 To solve these problems, com-
mentators have suggested discounting to present value8 9 and averaging
the results of several formulas.90
B. Alternative Valuation Methods
In situations where accounting methods are not appropriate, 91 the court
must apply alternative valuation methods to determine the value of the
husband's interest in his professional practice. The first alternative is the
market value method, 2 which "sets a value on professional goodwill by
establishing what fair price would be obtained in the current open market
if the practice were sold."9 3 The market value method is favored by the
courts over all other methods when available because of its accuracy.94
However, this method has two disadvantages: (1) it is unethical and
against public policy to sell the goodwill of a law practice;95 and (2) the
market value approach is based in part upon the post-marital efforts of
the parties.9 8
83. Raggio, supra note 9, at 154; Identifying Professional Goodwill, supra note 33, at 341.
84. Raggio, supra note 9, at 154; Identifying Professional Goodwill, supra note 33, at 334.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 65-70.
86. Identifying Professional Goodwill, supra note 33, at 334.
87. Community Property Valuation, supra note 69, at 447.
88. E.g., In re Marriage of Fortier, 34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1973) (Court
adopted the husband's valuation of practice's goodwill as $10,963 on basis of market value
and rejected wife's valuation of $294,333 based on capitalization of excess earnings).
89. Valuation of Goodwill, supra note 33, at 203-05.
90. Identifying Professional Goodwill, supra note 33, at 334.
91. See supra text accompanying note 69.
92. See In re Marriage of Fortier, 34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1973) (Court
held that the value of goodwill of the husband's medical practice was the market value at
which it could be sold.).
93. Identifying Professional Goodwill, supra note 33, at 334.
94. Valuation of Goodwill, supra note 33, at 201.
95. Valuation of Goodwill, supra note 33, at 200. Thus, it is unlikely there will be a pre-
determined value, at least for a law practice; and "no readily available market exists upon
which to gauge the practice's value." Id. In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 109-10,
113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 68 (1974). See also In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 49 (1974); In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481, 558 P.2d 279 (1976).
96. Valuation of Goodwill, supra note 33, at 200; see also Identifying Professional Good-
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The second alternative method involves analysis of the provisions of
buy-sell agreements. The value of goodwill under this method is the pre-
determined amount stipulated by the parties in either a partnership
agreement or an unexercised option, designating the interest of each part-
ner in the practice. This amount coupled with the value of the husband's
capital assets results in a presumptive value of the interest in the profes-
sional practice which can be attacked only by clear and convincing evi-
dence. 7 Before such a method can be used reliably, it must be shown that
the values are subject to periodic and careful review." However, the
amount contained in the buy-sell agreement is not binding upon the
court.99
A third alternative method is that of Revenue Ruling 59-60, which con-
cerns the valuation of assets of a closely-held corporation for federal es-
tate and gift tax purposes.100 Valuation of the husband's interest in his
professional practice is accomplished through an analysis of:
(a) The nature of the business and the history of the enterprise from its
inception.
(b) The economic outlook in general and the condition and outlook of the
specific industry in particular.
(c) The book value of the stock and the financial condition of the
business.
(d) The earning capacity of the company.
(e) The dividend-paying capacity.
(f) Whether or not the enterprise has goodwill or other intangible value.
(g) Sales of the stock and the size of the block of stock to be valued.
(h) The market price of stocks of corporations engaged in the same or
similar line of business having their stocks actively traded in a free open
market, either on an exchange or over-the-counter [basis].1'0
Although this method was previously used only for federal tax purposes,
it has been adapted to the valuation of assets for marital property disso-
will, supra note 33, at 334-35.
97. Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, -, 331 A.2d 257, 261 (1975).
98. Id. at -, 331 A.2d at 261. See also Grayer v. Grayer, 147 N.J. Super. 513, - 371
A.2d 753, 757 (1977) (court refused to rely on the amount in the partnership agreement for
valuation purposes because it had not been reviewed periodically).
99. See In re Marriage of Slater, 100 Cal. App. 3d 241, 160 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1980) (court
was not bound by the amount in the agreement which was determinative of husband's con-
tractual withdrawal rights and not his interest in the partnership); In re Marriage of Morris,
588 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (court was not restricted to valuation methods in stock
redemption agreement because neither method contemplated valuation for marital dissolu-
tion purposes); In re Hayden, 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2826 (Wash. Ct. App. June 18, 1979)
(agreement providing for no goodwill was only binding among the partners and not on the
court).
100. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, modified, Rev. Rul. 65-193, 1965-2 C.B. 370.
101. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237 at 238-39.
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lution purposes."°
A final method recognized by the courts is a valuation based on several
specific factors. If the goodwill of the professional practice is the marital
asset subject to distribution, this method requires its value to be deter-
mined by an examination of:
(1) the age and health of the practitioner;
(2) his professional reputation;
(3) the nature and duration of the business;
(4) the value of tangible and intangible assets;
(5) past earning power;
(6) and comparative business success.103
If the husband's interest in the professional practice itself is the sub-
ject of distribution, its value must be determined by an examination of:
(1) capital accounts and investments;
(2) fixed and miscellaneous assets, including accounts receivable, costs ad-
vanced, work in progress, work completed but not billed, cash and partner-
ship life insurance;
(3) goodwill;
(4) business liabilities;
(5) and accrued equity.1"'
The courts applying this method recognize that there is no set rule for
the determination of the husband's interest in the professional practice.
Instead, the trial court must examine each factor in the context of a given
case to determine the correct value of the interest. The appellate courts
will generally recognize any valuation based on these factors as long as
the trial court has not relied on future earnings of either party.
The foregoing represent the most common methods employed by the
courts to value the spousal interest in a professional practice.10' No one
particular method is best suited for all situations. Instead, the method
utilized must reflect the factual situation in each individual case.
102. See Nehorayoff v. Nehorayoff, 108 Misc. 2d 311, 437 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1981) (court
awarded the wife 25% of the husband's closely-held medical corporation on the basis of
Rev. Rul. 59-60). See generally Lavene v. Lavene, 162 N.J. Super. 187, 392 A.2d 621 (1978)
(court did an in-depth analysis of each factor under Rev. Rul. 59-60).
103. In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 109-10, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 68 (1974). See
also In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1974); In re Marriage
of Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481, 558 P.2d 279 (1976).
104. In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d at 110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 69. See also Stern
v. Stern, 66 N.J. at -, 331 A.2d at 261. See generally Annot., 74 A.L.R.3d 621 (1976).
105. Other less common methods of valuation of goodwill include the use of a percentage
of one year's average gross income, Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, _, 301 P.2d
90, 95 (1956); Barton v. Barton, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2453 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 20, 1982),
and the use of the Uniform Partnership Act to determine the value of spousal interest,
Riegler v. Riegler, 243 Ark. 113, 419 S.W.2d 311 (1967) (discussing UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT
]] 25.28, 6 U.L.A. 5 (1969)).
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR VIRGINIA LAW
Effective in 1982, Virginia abandoned its strict common law or title
view of marital property and adopted an equitable distribution statute.106
The court is given three duties under the statute to insure an equitable
division of marital assets.107 The court must determine: (1) which prop-
erty is subject to equitable distribution;01 (2) the value of the marital
property; 0 9 and (3) the equitable apportionment of the marital assets in
106. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Cum. Supp. 1982). The statute's legislative history indi-
cates that:
[t]he primary thrust of this section is to recognize marriage as a partnership to
which each party contributes, albeit not always equally, to the well-being of the fam-
ily unit. These contributions, both monetary and nonmonetary, have value and
should be weighed, along with other factors, in allocating marital assets or their dollar
equivalent between the parties when they are divorced or their marriage is dissolved.
REPORT OF THE JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE STUDYING SECTION 20-107 OF THE CODE OF VIRGINIA TO
THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, H. Doc. No. 21, at 6 (1982) [here-
inafter cited as REPORT].
107. REPORT, supra note 106, at 6. See also Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d
496 (1974) (three-step procedure under the New Jersey equitable distribution statute);
Grosman, supra note 5, at 203-04.
108. The statute divides property into two categories-marital and separate. While mari-
tal property can be the proper subject of equitable distribution, the court has no jurisdiction
over separate property. Separate property is defined as:
(i) all property, real and personal, acquired by either party before the marriage;
(ii) all property acquired during the marriage by bequest, devise, descent, survivor-
ship or gift from a source other than the other party; and
(iii) all property acquired during the marriage in exchange for or from the proceeds of
sale of separate property, provided that such property acquired during the marriage
is maintained as separate property. Income received from, and the increase in value
of, separate property during the marriage is separate property.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
Marital property is defined as:
(i) all property titled in the names of both parties, whether as joint tenants, tenants
by the entirety or otherwise, and
(ii) all other property acquired by each party during the marriage which is not sepa-
rate property as defined above. All property acquired by either spouse during the
marriage is presumed to be marital property in the absence of satisfactory evidence
that it is separate property.
Id. § 20-107.3(A)(2).
109. The statute provides a list of factors which the court must consider in determining
the amount of the award and its method of payment. These factors are:
1. The contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of
the family;
2. The contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party in the acquisition
and care and maintenance of such marital property of the parties;
3. The duration of the marriage;
4. The ages and physical and mental condition of the parties;
5. The circumstances and factors which contributed to the dissolution of the mar-
riage, specifically including any ground for divorce under the provisions of § 20-
91(1),(3) or (6) or § 20-95;
6. How and when specific items of such marital property were acquired;
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the form of a monetary award.11
The enactment of this statute raises the question of whether spousal
interest in a professional practice is marital property in Virginia, and if
so, how it should be valued. The Virginia courts should recognize spousal
interest in a professional practice obtained during the marriage as marital
property subject to division. This proposition is based on an analysis of
the case law and statutory definition of marital property. However, the
Virginia courts will be confronted with the same problem which faced the
Hirschfeld court. The statute fails to provide a standard by which this
interest is to be valued, and there is no Virginia case law on point. In
situations where there is extrinsic evidence of a firm's value, as in a recent
purchase, the courts should adopt the market value method to determine
the appropriate value."" Where such evidence is not available, the court
should consider adopting the formula approach promulgated in Revenue
Ruling 68-609 by the Internal Revenue Service." 2 The inclusion of
spousal interest in a professional practice as marital property would in-
sure the equitable distribution of all marital assets upon the dissolution
of marriage."'3
V. CONCLUSION
The New York court in Hirschfeld v. Hirschfeld held that a spouse's
interest in a professional practice is subject to equitable distribution.
This holding reflects the modern view of the marriage relationship as a
partnership. Each party contributes both monetarily and nonmonetarily
7. The debts and liabilities of each spouse, the basis for such debts and liabilities,
and the property which may serve as security for such debts and liabilities;
8. The present value of pension or retirement benefits, whether vested or
nonvested;
9. The liquid or nonliquid character of all marital property;
10. The tax consequences to each party; and
11. Such other factors as the court deems necessary or appropriate to consider in
order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award.
Id. § 20-107.3(E).
110. The court is restricted in its methods to achieve an equitable distribution. An award
of property is only appropriate when both parties share legal title to the property. Id. § 20-
107.3(C). A monetary award of marital property is appropriate regardless of title. The court
presumes that each party has an equitable interest in the marital property in order to deter-
mine the monetary award. However, this is for the limited purpose of determining the
amount of award only and does not attach to the legal title. Id. § 20-107.3(B). The monetary
award can take the form of a lump sum payment or periodic payments in fixed amounts. Id.
§ 20-107.3(D).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 91-95.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 65-70.
113. Where the professional practice is determined to have a value, a monetary award
would be the most likely means of achieving an equitable apportionment because the spouse
of a professional typically does not possess legal interest in the professional practice. See
supra note 110.
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to the acquisition of marital assets, and equity requires the distribution
of these assets upon the dissolution of the marriage. The Virginia courts
should recognize spousal interest in a professional practice as marital
property under its equitable distribution statute. However, the valuation
of that interest will continue to present problems because there are no
concrete objective formulas available. Instead, each case must be deter-
mined upon its own peculiar facts with the appropriate valuation method
then being applied.
David W. Hagy
